Abstract-In the last few years authentication has become of paramount importance both on the corporate Intranets and on the global Web. While most approaches focus on the initial authentication and then no further check ensure the identity of the navigating user, in this work we present a fuzzy approach to multi-modal authentication for a trust-based, continuous identity check during Web navigation. The potentiality of such an approach for generating trust-based metadata is also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years authentication has become of paramount importance both on corporate Intranets and on the global Web.
In this setting, the effectiveness of access control systems rests on one initial important assumption, proper user identification [4] : no one should be able to acquire the access rights of another person. In the literature this condition has been faced with two different approaches: biometric identification and biometric authentication [9] . Biometric identification and authentication are differentiated as follow: biometric identification occurs when an individual provides a sample biometric, sometimes without any additional knowledge, and the system must compare that sample with every stored record to identify a match. This is known as a one-to-many match, and is executed without any corroborating data. By contrast, biometric authentication occurs when an individual presents a biometric sample, and some additional identifying data, such as a photograph or password, which is then compared with the stored sample for that individual. Biometric authentication provides some inherent advantages as compared to other nonbiometric identifiers since biometrics correspond to a direct evidence of the personal identity versus possession of secrets which can be potentially stolen. Moreover, most of the times the biometric enrollment is executed in-person and in controlled environments making it very reliable for future use. Both engines try to check the user's credentials before granting access to a computer system. Some issues related to strong (i.e., biometric) authentication methods are still unsolved. In some cases, if the input sample quality is not sufficient for further processing, the system must reacquire data, and the resulting system might be more complicated or a limited lifetime. In highly sensitive environments, such as health-care databases, it may be necessary to perform strong authentication many times (e.g., at random intervals) to prevent identity substitution after the initial authentication step. In such a scenario, the authentication system must distinguish between the initial step, in which it uses strong authentication to identify the user, and the following authentication steps in which the system decides if its trust in user's identity is high enough to allow the user to continue to perform the activity she is doing. Unfortunately, keeping the user identity under control during complex Web interaction may introduce unaccettable costs and delays.
In this paper we analyze the potentialities of multi-modal authentication for a trust-based, continuous identity check during web navigation. Authentication confidence can thus be expressed via suitable Semantic Web-style metadata, increasing the overall information about the interaction. In our approach different trust levels are set for different methods of authentication. When a user gains access to a protected part of the web, our system continuously checks whether the users' authentication data can be trusted, e.g. enough to satisfy the required security clearance level. In this way, users are kept under a continuous authentication process and security clearance levels can be rigorously maintained. In particular, focus of this paper is a deep discussion of the methodologies for biometric authentication available w.r.t. their possible use in conjunction with a fuzzy controller. The paper is organized as follows: Sect. II discusses the basic problems posed by a fuzzy representation of biometric authentication techniques, in Sect. III we present our fuzzy controller for multi-modal authentication, and finally, in Sect. IV we draw our conclusion and present some future work.
A. Related Work
Several security methods for user authentication to control access to an information service have been discussed in the literature, showing how the identity theft becomes a critical issue, together with the management of rights. Indeed, as previously defined, traditional authentication systems may become inadequate since they do not identify a user as such.
As indicated in the work carried out by Bhargav-Spantzel and colleagues [9] , the act of impersonating others identities by presenting stolen identifiers or proofs of identities has been receiving increasing attention because of its high financial and social costs. For this reason, the adoption of biometric authentication systems becomes an emerging approach to the problem of reducing such identity theft. The authors provided a two-phase authentication mechanism for federated identity management systems, preserving the privacy with biometrics techniques. Further improvements have been carried out in the last few years, increasing the awareness that multimodal authentication (i.e., techniques using more than one form of credential to identify a user) is generally stronger than any single-mode authentication method. In multi-modal systems "redundancy" is used to tolerate possible failures of authentication devices, including those due to users anomalies (e.g., skin diseases may prevent fingerprint acquisition). In this context, the multi-modal approach was originally introduced in order to alleviate the drawbacks of each individual technique. The work [14] presents a multi-biometric verification system that combines speaker and fingerprint verification with face identification. The authors use a fuzzy decision support system in order to take into account the external conditions that can affect verification performances. They show how the fusion of the three techniques reduces the error rates of 48% w.r.t. the speaker verification alone.
About face recognition, [16] presents a face template matching algorithm based on a 3D head model created from a single frontal face image. In this way the matching is robust across variations in pose, expression and illuminations conditions. B oreover, the authors describe a method for tracking a face on a video sequence, by recovering the full-motion and the expression deformation of the face using 3D expressive facial model. From some characteristic face points given on the first frame, an approximated 3D model of the face is re-constructed. Using a steepest descent image approach, the algorithm is able to extract simultaneously the parameters related to the face expression and to the 3D posture. Industrial researchers at Hitachi (http: //www. sdl.hitachi.co. jp) developed a fully-fledged multi-modal system capable of choosing the "right" authentication technique depending on the required security clearance level. However, to the best of our knowledge [15] is the first paper where multi-modality is applied to the problem of checking continuously user identity during a working session to avoid malicious behavior such as identity substitution.
Several works have been carried out in the literature by considering these features. In the work of O'Gorman [7] a detailed comparison of strong (biometric) and weak (traditional) authentication technologies has been carried out, discussing about the potential attacks against each technique and the main issues related to several applications. 0 e now focus on representation and management of approximation in biometric matching.
II. FUZZY REPRESENTATIONS OF BIOB ETRIC
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES In this section we discuss which authentication device commercially available can be used with a fuzzy controller. Commonly biometric devices base their final decision (authenticated/refused) on a matching between a stored template and a new biometric acquisition, obviously each technique implements a different matching function and not all outputs of these functions are suitable to work as input of a fuzzy controller. B oreover, biometric data is probabilistic in nature, which implies that two samples of the same individual are never exactly the same. In this paper we do not deal with this aspect of the problem, that could in principle be addressed by using probabilistic fuzzy logic system (PFLS) [25] '.
In the following we detail the main features of the matching functions used by the most common biometric devices:
. 31t is a different technology than speech recognition, which recognizes words as they are articulated, which is not a biometric.
behavior of the individual. These methods all compare the similarities and differences between the input voice and the stored voice states to produce a recognition decision. The input voice sample and enrolled models are then compared to produce a likelihood ratio indicating the likelihood that the input sample came from the claimed or hypothesized speaker. Signature dynamic signature recognition uses multiple characteristics in the analysis of an individual's handwriting. These characteristics vary in use and importance from vendor to vendor and are collected using contact sensitive technologies, such as PDAs, digitizing tablets. Most of the features used are dynamic characteristics rather than static and geometric characteristics, although some vendors also include these characteristics in their analysis. Common dynamic characteristics include velocity, acceleration, timing, pressure, and direction of the signature strokes, all analyzed in the X, Y and Z direction. Some dynamic signature recognition algorithms incorporate a learning function to account for the natural changes or drift that occur in an individual's signature over time. The recognition methods vary widely. The dominant methods are feature analysis and stroke code sequences used by most of the commercial systems. Some systems use chain codes, some others use template matching or elastic matching. The chain codes are of extreme points: left, right, top and bottom. Template matching simply means matching an unknown character against stored character templates. This template matching system matches sequences of x/y coordinates, probably in a linear manner. Elastic matching is a form of nonlinear template matching [18] . Obviously, not all the techniques presented above are suitable inputs for a fuzzy controller. For example fingerprint, hand geometry, iris, retina and face recognition base their matching function on the definition of distance values between templates and new enrollments, giving a straightforward definition of possible membership functions in a fuzzy controller. On the other side, behavioral techniques such as voice or signature authentication base their matching mechanism on statistical considerations making more difficult a possible interpretation in a fuzzy system. In Table I we summarize our conclusions about the suitability of each biometric device in conjunction with a fuzzy controller.
Since our approach needs to continuously check the identity of the user while she is working, we want it to be the least intrusive as possible. Hence we will not consider devices such as retina or iris systems, because they would require the user to interrupt her activity for a while during the biometric acquisition process. In this work, we will not deal with fingerprint and hand geometry because these techniques require devices having a limited lifetime. More importantly, they hardly guarantee that the person who is provides biometric data is the same that was authenticated originally. For example, suppose that university students sit their exams using 
Our approach includes a trust evaluation process which continuously checks the identity of the user who is performing a certain activity on the webl After an initial authentication, the server can require further authentication steps based on two parameters 1) the level of trust previously computed and 2) the time passed from the last authenticationl We suppose the first authentication to have been performed using both strong and weak techniquesl Indeed the userlD is used to choose in the database the template to be used in the matching of the biometric acquisitions, because in a matching one-to-one the error rates are significantly reducedl The following steps, instead, can be acquired by strong or weak techniques on the basis of the trust levelI
B. Trust Evaluation Parameters
In our model each user authentication can be performed using strong or weak authentication techniquesl The BIO value represents how the biometric enrollment matches the user's template, normalized in the range [0, 1]I The second authentication parameter, TOK, corresponds to the boolean output (low/high) of the weak authentication system which supports the evaluation of the trust in the user's identity during the activityl In our prototype we used a UserId/password systeml At the initial authentication step, the weak technique is involved to enforce the biometric acquisition and the parameter TOK, if the authentication successes, is set to high, ilel equal to 11 Two aging parameters, respectively for the biometric and the token parameter values, are defined in order to measure how the system's trust in the identity of the user decays in timel This example has been fully developed in [2] in which we detailed the membership function construction and the definition of the fuzzy rulesl Figure 1 shows the membership functions used to fuzzify the feature vector distance crisp output obtained by the face recognition module (PCA)I 1) Trust Evaluation Parameter BIO in case of biometric multi-modal authentication: In our controller, we introduce the biometric input by means of a separated module (in Figure 2 it is the module "Strong Authentication System")I As a consequence, the controller itself does not depend on a specific technique, or set of techniques, used to compute BIOI Hence each application is free to implement the choice of biometric devices that best suits its needsl In particular environments, where security is a strategic issue, it can be important to use a multi-modal technique for the evaluation of the parameter BIO to be fed into the fuzzy controllerl In literature there have been proposed many general strategies to combine multiple biometric classifiersl Among them, Ross and Jain [19] have proved that the SUM works well in improving significantly authentication performances wlrItI a mono-modal approachl Other solutions include majority vote [20] , optimal combination of patter classifiers [21] , a weighted vote based on Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [22] , binary operators, etc. Moreover, there are multiple factors that have to be considered when building a biometric multi-modal system:
. choice and number of biometric features;
. detail level in which feature information have to be integrated into the classifier; . adopted methodology used to integrate information; . cost versus performance evaluation analysis. The evaluation of these factors strongly depends from the application and from the set of biometric techniques adopted. We defer a study in depth of these aspects of the problem to a future development of a case study with multi-modal biometric access.
C. Fuzzy Controller Operation
The entire process implemented in our approach is shown in Figure 2 . At the first step, the information obtained by the biometric engine, i.e. the value BIO, and the parameter TOK are fed into a fuzzy inference engine Fuzzy Trust Model in order to calculate a trust value TRUST that expresses the level of trust of the system in the user's identity after the initial authentication at time to. Of course, prior to processing of the inputs, it is necessary to define fuzzy membership functions which define the degree of membership of each input parameter in the context of the proposed model. Also, it is necessary to define the controller's fuzzy rules. These aspects strongly depend on the application and have been detailing discussed in [2] in case study that uses the face recognition authentication technique.
At time to BIO and TOK are initialized; at each time ti (i > 0), the decay rate of these values will depend on the corresponding aging parameters. The TRUST value is then defuzzified through a Defuzzifier engine, using the standard centroid-of-area technique. The output is then fed to another fuzzy engine, Fuzzy DSS Model, to compute the final level of trust. This second engine takes as inputs, together with the trust defuzzified value, also external conditions, that may become useful in such a multi-modal authentication approach, that consider biometric authentication techniques. Acceptance rate may degrade due to context variables (e.g., when the lighting is too bright or too dark). In this setting, these context variables are generally named CONTEXT and supposed, for simplicity, with possible fuzzy values "good" and "poor". The resulting trust of the Fuzzy DSS Model is defuzzified again with the standard centroid-of-area technique, and the output value is compared with the threshold of the membership functions of the Fuzzy DSS Model at each time ti.
If the output trust is low the system asks for trust enforcement by going through the Matching phase. In this case the system asks for a user re-authentication, that can be biometric or knowledge-based, depending on the BIO and TOK values at that time ti. In particular, the system re-acquires the parameter whose value at time ti is less than a corresponding minimum threshold, previously defined, while maintains the same value at time ti if it is more than the corresponding threshold. If the trust output is considered medium or high the system checks, through the Time Controller module, how the trust acquired at time ti has been affected by the decay rate of the BIO and TOK, giving the new, decreased, parameter values for BIO and TOK at time ti+,. These values are fed into the Fuzzy Trust Model in order to obtain the new trust value at time ti+,.
When the trust level decays to the value of very low, the user inserts two wrong passwords in the same weak authentication step, or when the maximum value of the examination time is reached, the execution step goes to the Close User Working Session and the process stops.
Each of the two fuzzy models has been implemented (see [2] ) with different rules, in order to control the trust value at each time step ti with respect to different evolved parameters of BIO and TOK. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on the problem of a secure strong authentication of a web navigator. Our approach uses a fuzzy controller to continuously check the user identity during a working session. In this paper we deeply discuss biometric techniques characteristics and their possible use in conjunction with a fuzzy controller. Moreover we provide a draft of using our approach with a multi-modal biometric technique to compute the biometric input of the fuzzy controller. In the next future we plan to apply our solution to a real case using multiple devices to compute the biometric input, providing experimental results and performance analysis.
The authentication system presented in this work can be able to define trust assertions similar to those presented in [26] . An example of such XML metadata is described in Figure 3 , where the metadata assertion is associated with the ) DF Schema () DFS). Our Description element uses a property called have-trust for associating a fuzzy value representing the level of trust computed at time time.
An in depth discussion about this aspect will be object of our future work.
